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Building the normative dimension(s) 
of a global polity
JA M E S  B R A S S E T T  A N D  R I C H A R D  H I G G O T T
Introduction
Globalisation is not what it used to be. Earlier debates over how to read the indicators
of economic liberalisation and the impact of technological expansion have now been
joined by the increasingly pressing need to explore the social, environmental and
political aspects of global change. Earlier discussions emphasised a number of
dichotomies within the international political economy – open/closed, state/market
and so on. These have proved limited in their ability to inform explanations of
change under conditions of globalisation. To these we must now add what we might
call the ‘governance from above’, ‘resistance from below’ dichotomy as a popular
metaphor for understanding order and change in international relations under
conditions of globalisation. But this new binary axis is in many ways as unsatis-
factory as those that went before. It too can obscure as much as it reveals in terms of
understanding the normative possibilities of reforming globalisation. In this article
we wish to suggest that there is perhaps a more useful way of thinking about politics
and the changing contours of political life in the contemporary global order. This
approach blurs the distinction between governance and resistance by emphasising an
ethical take on globalisation.
Building on some innovations in social theory that have found their way into
international relations scholarship we stress the need for a permanently reflexive
relationship between meta-theory, social, political and economic theory and policy
practice at the global level. The social science academy, especially the tradition of
neoclassical economics, offers (both explicitly and implicitly) much more than mere
scholastic meditation. As we have long known, it informs the practical horizons for
the policy community. Academic understanding is not simply the depoliticised
provision of technical mechanisms for governing (or not governing). It is itself a
political act that casts massive shadows over policy.
Globalisation is not simply ‘out there’. It is constructed through our under-
standings of communicative practices. A self-conscious promotion of theoretical
innovation as a political act is not an exercise in reflection for its own sake. Any
attempt to understand and explain the nature of social structures and processes
must subsequently provide a normative justification for a chosen preferred approach.
As a critique of rationalism, the identification of the epistemology of power (the
major strength of postmodernism) is not, of itself, sufficient. It must be accom-
panied by a self-conscious normative intent if we are to build the ethical dimensions
of globalisation. If, to borrow a phrase, globalisation is what we make of it, the
content of ‘what’ and the group that is ‘we’ are ethical questions of direct policy
relevance to the contemporary global political economy. This article seeks to draw
together a redescription of globalisation as both an ethical and political question
with the bones of a reformist way of considering how to socially re-embed its more
technocratic and economistic elements.
Apart from the work of a few notable, though often politically marginal authors,
this normative facet of globalisation has either been ignored, or worse still, assumed
to be a commonly agreed objective. This was invariably the case amongst leading
globalisers – that is, proponents of the continued liberalisation of the global
economic order occupying positions of influence in either the public or the private
policy domains – during the 1990s. But it was also often the case in the community
of academic economists interested in globalisation, for whom there has been an
unproblematic conflation of economic growth with human welfare on the one hand,
and the subsequent marginalisation of any reflective normative theorising about
issues of justice in the policy domain on the other. For a range of reasons, including
the efforts of resistance-based political groups, the period since the late 1990s has
seen a recognition of this lacuna in both the global policy community and the
scholarly economic community.1
This under-representation of the normative dimension of globalisation throughout
the 1990s was, with a few exceptions, as much a weakness of (international) political
theory as it was a failure of neoliberal economic theory and policy practice to
engage the ethical underpinnings of economic globalisation.2 As currently constituted,
the institutions of global economic governance, and the rationalist theories of
liberal economy which underpin them, offer little in the way of substantive, ethically
sophisticated, political agendas for humanising globalisation.3 Similarly, as currently
constituted, competing cosmopolitan theories of international relations or liberal
political philosophies of justice, upscaled to the global level, exhibit too little an
appreciation of the dynamic(s) of the market place to offer meaningful ways of
addressing the political legitimacy deficit in the global economic order. It is only in
the creation of a dialogue across the domains of economics, political theory and
policy practice that meaningful mechanisms for reform are likely to emerge. The
article therefore seeks to operationalise a conception of justice via a redescription of
globalisation as an explicitly political and ethical issue.
Our first section adopts an analytical focus that takes account of the extant
sociopolitical transformations associated with globalisation. It aspires to a better
understanding of the preponderance of non-state actors and competing sites of
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1 For an analysis of the mood swing that is causing a major rethink about the normative dimensions of
the globalisation project, see Richard Higgott, ‘Contested Globalisation: the Changing Context and
Normative Challenges’, Review of International Studies, 26 (2000), pp. 131–53.
2 But see the essays in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds.), Inequality, Globalisation and World
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford:
Blackwells, 2001). See also Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2002).
3 For an explanation of these limitations, see Richard Higgott, ‘Taming Economics, Emboldening
International Relations: The Theory and Practice of International Political Economy in an Era of
Globalisation’, Stephanie Lawson (ed.), The New Agenda for International Relations: From
Polarisation to Globalisation in World Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
authority in the global system than can be captured by ‘systemic’ or ‘international
society’ theorising. To that end the article makes a cursory delineation of the con-
tours of what has been called elsewhere ‘a global polity’ and outlines some of its
central points of contest. By this we do not mean that there is a world government,
or that politics is no longer inter- or intra-state focused. Rather it is observed that
the extant global space provides for a different, and emerging form of politics that
requires alternative theoretical elaboration.4
A return to ethical theory might allow us a different and (potentially) more
constructive way of regarding the development of the global polity than is gleaned
from economically rationalist accounts of globalisation on the one hand, or some of
the more traditional veins of international theory on the other. In both its proble-
matisation of the relationship between individuals/groups and institutions, and in its
preoccupation with the question of community, ethical theory in international
relations – be it cosmopolitan or communitarian – represents a conduit into the
politics of the global polity. But, we argue, this utility as a conduit does not
necessarily lead to a meaningful agenda for change.
Our second section therefore examines the difficulties of extracting a ‘practical’
ethic commensurate with a broad-based political reform of globalisation. The debate
between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism itself highlights the problem of
achieving a standard of justice in a world of different sociocultural particularities
and realistic power structures that delimit the ‘arc of possibilities’5 open to
practitioners. It is all very well to suggest ethical utopias, but quite another thing to
find agreement on their content, or ‘convince’ the deep structures of political, social,
economic, and psychological interests at work in the global polity of their desir-
ability.
In its more predictive forms the communitarian position – as it is understood
within IR – is found to equate ethics with power, since most of the ‘stuff’ of ethical
politics is reduced to the relations between, rather than within, communities. This
article proposes that the strength of the communitarian position has perpetuated a
tradition of middle-way theorising in IR. Pace the English School and Neoliberal
Institutionalism, much speculation on the normative dimension(s) of the global
polity has been presaged upon the need to reconcile the competing claims of
individuals (usually read as a universal given) and communities (usually read as
states). Whilst laudable, such philosophical refinement, even in those most sophistic-
ated of renderings provided by, say, Andrew Linklater,6 may be more exemplary of
the limitations of normative theorising for the global polity than the possibilities
that could be built. Indeed, the very framing of this debate may itself act to constrict
the possibilities for engagement. Foundationalist arguments may simply waste too
much intellectual energy attempting to define ‘what is’ in order to legitimise their
arguments for ‘what should be’? 
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4 For an elaboration of this line of argument, see Richard Higgott and Morten Ougaard, ‘Beyond
System and Society: Towards a Global Polity?’ in Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott (eds.), A
Global Polity (London: Routledge, 2002).
5 Jim George, ‘Creating Globalisation: ‘‘Patriotic Internationalism’’ and Symbiotic Power Relations in
the Post WW2 Era’, Working Paper 66/01, University of Warwick: Centre for the Study of
Globalisation and Regionalisation, January 2001.
6 See his Transformation of Political Community: The Ethical Foundations of the Post Westphalian Era
(Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
Thus, in the third section we suggest that the anti-foundationalist pragmatism of
Richard Rorty offers a more interesting and practical philosophical question of
‘what could be?’ In this we follow previous work in normative IR that notes the
heuristic utility of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate while suggesting its
ultimately constraining nature. By applying Rorty’s thought to the salient political
issue of globalisation, this article seeks to contribute towards the work of those
contemporary international theorists who have engaged Rortian pragmatism.7 We
draw on Rorty´s work to make an argument in favour of a pragmatic praxis as a
viable means of developing understanding(s) of, and the normative potential within,
the global polity.
In the simple and under-theorised sentimentality of the Rortian ethic of redescrip-
tion we find an imaginative springboard for launching a reformist agenda. Rortian
pragmatism is advanced for its ‘enabling qualities’. Firstly, it enables us to view our
approach as both contingent and fallible, thus imploring us to build the normative
agendas we support. Political praxis is central to such theory/practice. And secondly,
it enables us to view our approaches as experimental. Rather than losing ourselves in
some ethic that ‘changes the world’ we should instead focus our energies upon
‘small’ experimental approaches to issues like poverty, selfishness, technocratic
ignorance, depoliticised economism, the achievement of ‘voice’ for those accustomed
to going without it, and institutional reform. These agendas alone will not solve all
problems, rather they offer a focus and a drive to realise the (more) normative
dimension(s) that the global polity could potentially harbour.
By combining a political ontology of globalisation with an ethic of pragmatic
reformism we raise the salience of the role of sympathy and hope in the everyday
practices of the global polity. The propensity to elicit and actualise ethical values is a
function of the reflexive interrelations of multiple actors (international organis-
ations, states, NGOs, civil society, MNCs, financial market actors) operating at
multiple levels (international, supra-territorial, regional, local, and through the
media) within the global polity. There is no ethical end game to be realised: just a
more ethically and politically aware set of games to be played. In section four we
offer some initial and rudimentary suggestions about what pragmatic redescription
in the global polity might mean.
Towards a global polity?
Globalisation is an often-used and radically underspecified term. It has been
variously ascribed the characteristics of economic liberalisation, internationalis-
ation, universalisation, Westernisation, and deterritorialisation.8 Causal dynamics
32 James Brassett and Richard Higgott
7 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992) and on Rorty: ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’, in Tim Dunne and
Nicholas Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and
Molly Cochran, Normative Theory and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
8 For the best introductory discussion, see Jan Aart Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction
(London: Macmillan, 2000).
differ between perspectives but they all include some notion of heightened
economic, communicative, and technological interconnection. Although elements of
globalisation can be analytically separated and falsified, or not falsified, in this way,
in this article we use a minimalist conception of globalisation as the creation of an
extensively (though not uniformly) interconnected and contested global space. It is in
the nature and extent of this interconnection and contest that globalisation provokes
a number of questions that – by their very nature – serve to politicise the global
space.
In the most popularly received and most criticised reading, globalisation heralds
the dawn of a universal space in which the divisive influences of nationalism,
ethnicity, and religion will be transcended by secular modern liberal democracy.9 In
its more economistic interpretations the thesis has been bound up with the growth of
a global market for goods and services which, left unfettered, will break free from
the shackles of state regulation. In the 1990s globalisation for many governments
appeared to become a ‘normalising discourse’ of power that conditioned policy
responses to the perception, if not always the reality, of global market integration.
As we now appreciate, this hyper-globalist view over-egged the ascendancy of the
market and was too quick to write off the importance of the state both politically,
and as Paul Krugman has recently noted, economically.10 Such rhetorical depictions
of the state as ‘withering’ or ‘retreating’11 prompted a sustained backlash from
within a number of scholarly circles that sought to re-establish the importance of
the state as the main actor in international relations.12 Indeed much of the initially
popular and populist debate over globalisation turned on a rationalist-driven ‘states
vs. markets’ dichotomy. Such a seemingly zero-sum contest belied a capacity of the
state to secure a more gradual transformation in state-market relations; or, a
positive-sum diffusion of power amongst non-state actors operating in multiple sites
of authority in the global system.
A subtler rendition of the relationship between states and markets sees it as a
perpetual process of reconstruction of the mechanisms for sustaining capitalist
accumulation in an era of global structural change. From this standpoint, we can
accept the augmented power of the structures of global finance and production,
whilst recognising that there is still no substitute for the state as the repository of
sovereignty and rule-making and as provider of national security. But it is a state
that is in a process of adaptation. States have been joined by a host of non-state
actors operating at multiple sites of authority – both public and private – in the
global policy process.13
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9 Quintessentially, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1992).
10 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (London: The Allen Lane Press, 1999).
11 See Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (London: Harper Collins, 1995) and Susan Strange,
The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
12 For restatement of the strength of the state, see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, ‘Globalization –
a Necessary Myth?’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader: An
Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Cambridge Polity Press, 2000).
13 See the essays in Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds.), Private Authority and
International Affairs (New York: SUNY Press, 1999) and Richard Higgott and Geoffrey Underhill
and Andreas Bieler (eds.), Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System (London: Routledge,
2000).
A diffusion of power and influence through international organisations like the
IMF, World Bank, WTO, EU, and BIS, as well as the growing salience of private
and voluntary regulatory bodies has meant a complex expansion, no matter that it is
contested terrain, of the public sphere. There has, in short, been a ‘globalisation of
political life’. Three elements underwrite the claim for the emergence of the nascent
‘global polity’:14
1. Most obviously, there is a growing political interconnectedness. This is a pheno-
menon recognised several decades ago,15 but interconnectedness in a global
polity, as opposed to traditional understandings of the international system or
society, is not only between states, but also supra-, sub- and non-state actors.
2. There is a vast and interlocking network of global regulation and sites of
decision-making where policies of a (quasi-) global nature are made. We include
in this category the (international) institutions of global governance: the IMF,
World Bank, WTO, the UN agencies as well as the growing (if underexposed)
salience of organisations of private and non-state regulation in areas such as
credit rating and industry standards setting. That ratings agencies like Moodys
and Standard and Poors can strongly influence the economic fortunes of states
is surely a political relation as much as an economic one.16
3. A more difficult dimension of this process to capture, but no less important for
that, is the growing sense of ‘community’ that appears to be developing beyond
the confines of the state. As Robertson would have it, globality is defined in the
context of a consciousness ‘. . . of the world as a single place’. 17 This is not to
suggest the emergence of a common set of global values, rather to indicate the
growth of thinking about ‘the world’ as an identifiable sense of place or space
where different values can legitimately contest one another. A quintessential fact
of international political life has been the multiplication of global gatherings
that argue over the validity of a multiple array of global principles and
practices.18
It could even be argued that the contestable efficacy or legitimacy of these institu-
tions is itself a salient feature in the politics of the global polity. Even if states and
non-state actors are in disagreement about the norms and principles that are
emerging, in practice, by the very fact that they contest the nature of these principles
and practices in global assemblies and other instances of global public space, it has
the consequence (unintended as it may be) of furthering the development of a global
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14 The discussion in this section draws on Higgott and Ougaard, Global Polity.
15 See Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little Brown,
1977).
16 See T. J. Sinclair, ‘Passing Judgement: Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory Mechanism of
Governance in the Emerging World Order’, Review of International Political Economy, 1: (1994), pp.
133–49.
17 Roland Robertson, Globalisation, Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992), p. 132.
18 These can range from meetings of small non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Global Social
Movements (GSMs), through to the UN conference system. Gatherings at the global level cover
issues as diverse as gender, development, environment, welfare, cities, security to the Davos gatherings
of the rich and powerful of the private (and public) sector policymaking world and their counterpart
gatherings such as the Porto Allegro World Social Forum.
polity. On this view we might be able to understand realist or mercantilist positions
regarding globalisation for what they are – that is, coherent attempts to contest the
political meaning, and therefore social outcomes, of decision-making within the
global polity.
Governance, resistance and the possibilities for reform
To refine the analytical focus, we wish to talk about something more than traditional
state-centred understandings of world politics, as ´systemic´ or ´societal´ on the one
hand (still the principal mode of reasoning in international relations scholarship
along a Waltzian structuralist–international society/English School spectrum) but as
something less than a single complex of enforceable societal relationships on the
other. Greater attention has to be paid to the changes in the quality and quantity of
global structural change. Financial interconnections over recent decades have had a
profound effect upon the capacity of states to pursue national welfare options. This
is not simply to privilege structure at the expense of agency. States remain important
actors in world politics. But they have been joined by a host of non-state actors that
actively ‘transcend’ territorial politics in an attempt to realise their interests at
multiple levels, including the institutions of supra-territorial governance. To this
extent they are the players in the polity. Agents that would have once focused most
of their attention on attempting to influence the policy process within national
polities now channel more energy than in the past towards securing influence beyond
the boundaries of the state.
Most notably, there have been a number of significant points of resistance to
globalisation that have contested the free-market fundamentalism of the 1990s
Washington Consensus (WC) and ushered in a period of more socially aware
governance. For brevity’s sake we term this the era of the Post-Washington
Consensus (PWC).19 Some key events and features of this era include the failure of
MAI, the financial crises in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe, the semi-
institutionalisation of the anti-globalisation movement from Seattle on and, perhaps
most importantly, the growing belief that globalisation is at least correlated with, if
not proven to be causally related to, vast income differentials at the global level.
These have been focal points for the critical activities of an ever-burgeoning global
civil society. By contesting globalisation and the market orthodoxies of the earlier
‘Washington Consensus’ era through active public engagement, these events have
brought to the public sphere a metapolitics of instititutional legitimacy in which the
procedures of the global governance are subjected to greater public scrutiny than at
any time since their inception in the Bretton Woods era. Whether this process is itself
legitimate – according to the efficiency models of governance popular amongst the
policy communities that inhabit the corridors of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO –
or not, is itself contested.
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19 We are aware of the contentious and clichéd status of the terms ‘Washington and post-Washington
consensus’. We use them to capture the changing international mood at the end of the twentieth
century.
The important point for this article is that this growing public engagement,
through non-state actor pressure, has had an impact. Governance is not merely
resisted: interaction has on a number of occasions led to reform. A mood swing in
the global governance agenda has led to an increased concentration on a more
socially aware rhetoric of economic globalisation. In turn this has gone some way
towards a recognition that globalisation has to be politically socialised, legitimised
and democratised if the wider gains of the economic liberalisation process are not
also to be lost to its major beneficiaries. But we are at the beginning, not the end, of
this process of political deliberation. With neither agreement on the scope of the
global polity, nor the institutions of global governance strong enough to administer
to it, the global polity remains nascent and contested.
By reflecting such dynamics, we aim to demonstrate the inherent interrelation-
ship, and normative value, of political contest, governance and reform. Import-
antly for this article, the growing salience of new actors in the formulation of
public policy renders governance as a process more akin to ‘political negotiation’ –
weak and inhibited as it may be – rather than merely ‘efficient administration’. It is
this latter view – governance as efficient administration – that roughly approxi-
mates the position of many in the policy community influential over the shape and
course of globalisation. After the exposure of the institutions of the Washington
consensus to the failures of the late 1990s and the resultant contest over the
substantive content of future policy, ‘governance’ was a term that gained pre-
valence in the scholar cum policy community. In the recent public policy literature,
governance refers to ‘. . . . the development of governing styles in which boundaries
between and within public and private sectors have become blurred’.20 But this
definition neither notes the way globalisation has also blurred the domestic-
international divide as material fact, nor the longer term historical development of
systems of emerging international norms and regimes (both public and private)
that represent the elements of a framework of ‘governance without government’
under globalisation.21
In this way, the hosting metaphor of the global polity allows us to situate the
politics of ‘contested globalisation’ within the context of broader debates over
governance within International Relations.22 Understanding of, and attention to, the
importance of normative questions of governance and state practice as exercises in
accountability and democratic enhancement must catch up with our understanding
of governance as exercises in effectiveness and efficiency. In this way ‘politics’, as
opposed to ‘efficiency’, comes to occupy a more significant place in the discourse of
globalisation than much of the contemporary literature reflects. More importantly
for this article, with the introduction of politics as an explicitly normative concern,
the global polity is rendered susceptible to ethical scrutiny and questions of
legitimacy and justice, in a manner not possible under the hegemony of a neoliberal
economic orthodoxy of the Washington consensus era.
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20 Gerry Stoker, ‘Governance as Theory: Five Propositions’, International Social Science Journal, 155
(1999), p. 17.
21 See the pioneering essays in Ernst Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, Governance without
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
22 See Higgott, ‘Contested Globalisation’, pp. 131–53.
The ethical dimension(s) of the global polity
In the reading we advance here, and we recognise that it might not be the only
reading, the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians can usefully help
theorise the global polity for two reasons. Firstly, the status of individuals vis à vis
states and other institutions is understood as a core point of ethical debate. Whether
we accept the cosmopolitan view that man qua man is the ontological site for ethical
deliberation on the one hand, or the communitarian riposte on the other that an
acultural, ahistorical notion of individuality is simply untenable, it is clear that the
rise of supraterritorial relations within the global polity goes to the heart of some
profound philosophical questions. That the two debates should be combined appears
self-evident.
Secondly, in the tensions between universalism and particularism, which the
debate exposes, we can find illustrations of the kind of questions that can and
should be posed of international organisations, states, capital markets, civil society,
and MNCs. In the transnational spread of capitalist arrangements we discern a
number of contests over market structure, regulation standards, credit agreements,
and social welfare that are increasingly resolved within institutions of global
governance. Whether we regard this as an opportunity (as yet unrealised) to institute
universal standards for the global polity, or as an example of the putative
particularist domination of the world through the ascendancy of the Anglo-Saxon
model of capitalism, this contest will determine the way we frame the ethical
dimension(s) of the global polity. This section offers a generalised account of
cosmopolitanism and contrasts it with a communitarian perspective, before engaging
the ‘thinner’ cosmopolitanism of Andrew Linklater.
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism takes the view that social institutions should be justifiable on the
basis that they meet the ‘basic rights’ of individuals in respect of universal standards
of justice, liberty and equality. Although this position is not presaged upon the
interdependence of the world economy and resultant liberal optimism that accom-
panied the naïve language of early 1990s globalisation,23 it nevertheless attempts to
construct notions of justice that draw upon and go some way towards constructing
such an ideal. To the extent that human equality is a basic cosmopolitan world-view,
the globalisation of technological and communicative linkages can be seen as a
facilitator of cosmopolitan ethics. Although it is a large step from ‘one world
economy’ to a ‘community of mankind’, cosmopolitans could highlight the ethical
potentials of globalisation. Certainly when taken in the context of the end of the
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and a new ethos of openness – will transform our world into the beginnings of a global civilisation, a
new civilisation of civilisations, that will blossom through the coming century’, Peter Schwarz and
Peter Leyden, ‘The Long Boom: A History of the Future’, Wired, July 1997, p. 116.
Cold War and the genuine spread of ‘freedoms’ from ideological domination and
militarism, there is some credence to this view.
More substantively, there is a raft of political changes concomitant with globalis-
ation that could bring confidence to cosmopolitan positions. The division of the
world into states is one manifestation of how reason can, in effect, ‘globalise’.
Norms of representation and the chance of peaceful stability amongst states
represent an institutional medium for achieving universal standards. Add to that the
growing auspices of international governance institutions and the global polity
could be described as displaying what some have called ‘embedded cosmopoli-
tanism’.24 The burgeoning membership of bodies like the IMF, the WBG and the
WTO certainly creates the administrative capacity for a universal constituency.
Indeed, if such overtly market-oriented institutions could coordinate their policies
with the appropriate departments of the UN, as envisaged in the turn of the century
UNDP initiatives on governance and global public goods, and the UN’s Global
Compact with the private sector to promote human rights and raise labour and
environmental standards,25 then an ethical cosmopolitan order could be considered
a nascent reality.
However, as critics of cosmopolitanism would argue, the use of the word ‘if ’ is
crucial to this discussion. Indeed, the burden of political efficacy has been a central
concern for late twentieth-century cosmopolitan theorists. One response has been to
attach philosophical justification to extant changes associated with economic
globalisation. In Political Theory and International Relations (1979), for example,
Charles Beitz argued that interdependence in the global polity undermines the
assumption common amongst political theorists – and John Rawls in particular –
that states are self-sufficient entities which represent the sole site of political and
ethical discourse.26 From the perspective of the global polity outlined in our first
section, this is an observation we would accept intuitively, at least. Certainly it opens
the possibility for meaningful dialogue between political theory and IR. However,
Beitz’s development of this point serves rather to illustrate the institutional and
political problems that cosmopolitanism must face when applied at the global level.
He suggests that such extant trends in the international political economy could
point to a ‘global scheme of social co-operation.27 On this view, a case can be made
for viewing individuals as the prime foundation of justice and elicit the possibility of
global redistributive justice. This is strong stuff. By locating moral value in the
individual, Beitz questions the empirical and ethical autonomy of states and
therefore challenges the fundamental assumptions of both political theory and IR.
Yet we feel that the argument is undermined on two counts, one institutional, one
empirical.
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24 See Toni Erskine, ‘“Citizen of Nowhere” or “Point Where Circles Intersect”? Impartialist and
embedded cosmopolitans’, Review of International Studies, 28 (2002), pp. 457–78.
25 See Inge Kaul Isabell Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods: International
Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press for the UNDP and John G.
Ruggie).
26 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1979).
Much of Beitz’s discussion is set up as a critique of the bounded nature of justice in John Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). For the purposes of this article we
concentrate on the side of Beitz’s argument which focuses on economic interdependence.
27 Ibid., p. 149.
Firstly, although Beitz undermines the empirical and ethical strength of states by
founding justice in the person of the individual, he concedes that states – as the
central players in the global polity – will remain the primary mechanism for imple-
menting any kind of redistributive justice at the global level. As Molly Cochran
judges, on this view: ‘international distributive justice applies only derivatively to
states and principally to persons in the founding principles for the establishment of
just social arrangements’.28 This appears to be a compromise argument that surely
creates more problems than it solves. How one justifies the foundation of policy in
the ethical value of individuals and then persuades (different) states to administer it,
is a question that illustrates, rather than solves, the complexity of institutional
arrangements in the global polity.
Secondly, by attaching universalist arguments for distributive justice to empirical
rather than abstract criteria Beitz opens himself to empirical refutation. While
interdependence has grown in the absolute, in certain parts of the world it remains
very slight, even non-existent. If justice pertains to those areas with a higher level of
interdependence because that represents a scheme for cooperative venture what
becomes of those isolated areas less integrated into the global polity? Followed
through to its logical conclusion, Beitz’s argument would find a stronger case for
redistributive justice in Europe than it would in sub-Saharan Africa.29 This counter-
intuitive point presses the need for a more nuanced appreciation of globalisation
than simply a phenomenon of increased interdependence.
Further interpretations of the cosmopolitan tradition have taken this tack. David
Held and Anthony McGrew have investigated the potential of the institutions of
global governance for representation and accountability.30 This brand of cosmo-
politan democracy seeks to highlight the deficits between the major sites of power
and the dispossessed in the global polity. They propose a democratisation along a
scale of institutional form ranging from representative houses in the UN, the
increased representation of small states in international bodies and, in a form of
subsidiarity, the devolution of public policy to the lowest practicable level. Indeed,
Held’s notion of ‘double democratisation’, both within states and across borders,
represents one of the most ‘practical’ agendas for institutionalising cosmopolitan
justice in the global polity.31
Community and the global polity
Although we might note the ‘forward looking’ qualities of cosmopolitanism, both in
its ability to open debate on how we justify social arrangements and its attempt to
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attach such a theory to extant social changes in the global polity, there are deep
philosophical problems with such an account. Regardless of the complex institu-
tional arrangements required to administer the kind of moral inclusion and redis-
tributive justice which cosmopolitan theorists envisage, there are fundamental
questions over the ontological primacy attributed to individuals and the resultant
universalism it posits. From a communitarian perspective such universalism is
rendered an inaccurate depiction of reality, or worse, one that could hasten a form
of imperialism through ignorance to the social mores of different cultures.
A more critical reading of globalisation might highlight several different factors
not given great consideration in the more optimistic (essentially economistic) liberal
readings of cosmopolitanism. Whilst globalisation has been related to the trans-
national spread of communications and social relations through politico-economic
contact, the idealistic view that this will result in some form of cultural homogeneity
is severely questioned by the resurgence of religious, nationalist and ethnic politics in
the post-Cold War world. Whilst we might forgo the alarmist proto-realist cultural
determinism of authors like Samuel Huntington, it seems fair to recognise the
remarkable proliferation of identity-based politics that challenge the ‘Mc-World’ of
mainstream liberal discourse.32 Indeed many Southern and critical European schools
of thought have challenged the liberal discourse of socioeconomic governance in the
global polity as instances of Western (or more specifically, American) imperialism.
In doing this they necessarily highlight the relevance of community and communi-
tarian values in the global polity.
The communitarian tradition seeks to locate its ethical framework within the
‘polis’ as opposed to some external foundation. Against the universalism of cosmo-
politanism, communitarians assert the particular ‘truths’ of different cultures and
belief systems. Against the privileging of the individual over society they seek to
understand the individual as the product of contingent social relations of a
community. More fundamentally, communitarian thinkers locate moral value in the
very social relations and the institutions they produce. Thus the modern values of
liberty, equality and justice are not understood as abstract standards against which
institutions, like the state or market, can be judged. Rather ethics are seen as
constituted within those very institutions.
The ‘social embeddedness’ of market relations provides us with an example of
how cultural differences emerge within the global polity.33 Production structures,
organisational norms, and credit standards are all areas of human interaction. The
social norms of such interaction are born of particular cultural understandings of
reality prevalent in a given community. For example, in a communitarian analysis of
the Asian financial crisis the IMF, rather than instituting a value-free universal
standard of best economic practice, would be seen to be following a far more
particularist line. If we view the IMF doctrines of transparency and accountability
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as ‘Western’ values presaged upon the cultural dominance of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
model of capitalism, then the recommendations for the break up of Asian financial
and production frameworks becomes less a simple search for economic efficiency
and also (or more) a case of breaking the cultural norms of South East Asian eco-
nomic actors. On such a view we might further question whether Western economic
actors receive (unfair) competitive advantages from these new arrangements?34
In ethical philosophy, this idea of social embeddedness receives its most influential
and complicated rendering in the quasi-mythological ‘ethical state’ of Hegelian
thought. For Hegel the person is someone who is encumbered by social relations
whilst able to realise freedom within them. The (ethical) state provides the context in
which individuality and rules can be internalised so they are no longer regarded as
constraints. As Chris Brown states: ‘The state provides the element of unity
necessary if the individual is to overcome the separateness inherent in civil society.’35
By extrapolation, the communitarian dimension(s) of the global polity raise a
number of questions for institutions with a transnational influence. A strong
communitarian position sees the state as the sole arbiter of ethical value. This view
sits well with the realist assertion that international cooperation will, at all times, be
limited and transient depending upon the interests of (powerful) states.36 On weaker
readings this view has underpinned many of the English School pronouncements
upon the extent and limitations of international society.37 Robert Gilpin has taken
the communitarian perspective to infer the importance of ‘groups’.38 Thus his
rational choice political economy of international relations sets out to understand, if
not develop, the ethical value, of nations, classes and elites.39 More reflexive socio-
logical positions highlight the complexity of community-based interaction in which
the global polity has born witness to a proliferation of nations, ethno-nations and
transworld national diasporas. In addition there has been a growth of non-territorial
communities such as managerial class allegiances, women’s movements, lesbian and
gay solidarities, racial groups, religious groups/identities and a spread of global
youth culture.40 In this complex web the emphasis is less upon the exclusivity of
community in its demarcation of inside/outside binaries, but rather upon its capacity
for penetration and hybridisation.
Despite the strengths of the communitarian ethical perspective for theorising the
normative dimensions of the global polity, significant questions are evoked. For
instance, Hegelian notions of the ‘ethical state’ might elicit acceptance for acts of
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violence and infringements of ‘justice’ in the name of the ‘greater project’ of the
state. Hegelian method could be criticised for licensing a form of cultural relativism
that ignores the capacity of the state to do harm. Further, if we accept the worth of
social mores then moral judgement is made equivalent to power, since much of the
‘stuff ’ of ethical politics will be understood as functional between, rather than
within, communities. On this basis, the development of justice in the global polity is
beholden to those communities that have the power and the will to act. Thus much
of the ethical agenda of the global polity can become tied to the (lack of) interest
shown by the USA.
We would argue that these critiques are more than a question of taste. There is an
overwhelming theoretical flaw in the predictive nature of many communitarian
perspectives which delimit ethical deliberation to some reified conception of the ‘art
of the possible’. We would argue that there are, in fact, few straightforward con-
clusions to be drawn from the ‘situatedness’ of social experience, except that life is
contingent. Despite its obvious qualities, communitarianism should caution against
the danger of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. But, it is in the tension between
cosmopolitan ideals and the communitarian ‘art of the possible’ that much
normative international theorising has been conducted. The next section looks at a
recent significant attempt to develop a ‘thinner’ cosmopolitanism as a middle way in
this tension between cosmopolitan and communitarian ethics.
Transcending the ‘art of the possible’? Linklater and the ‘art of synthesis’
In the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians we have what appears to
be an intractable impasse inhibiting our ability to theorise the normative dimensions
of the global polity.41 Against the trans-historical standard of ‘justice as fairness’,
located in the universal rights of the individual, communitarians posit the social
contingency of individual liberty. From this, two dangers arise. Firstly, the global
polity might become conceived of as a ‘zero-sum’ ethical world in which we privilege
either the individual (risking imperialism) or the community (risking despotism).
Secondly, when framed in this way, the debate pre-favours a form of ethical
compromise in which we strive for justice on individual and community lines whilst
constantly qualifying that agenda with the realist(ic) ‘art of the possible’. This wide
acceptance of the fine balance between order and justice in international society has
for too long led us to privilege the ethical limits of the global polity rather than
search for its ethical possibilities. An attempt to transcend this conundrum can be
found in the work of Andrew Linklater.
A cosmopolitan in orientation, Linklater employs Hegelian method to argue his
case for reconstructing normative approaches to the social world.42 Echoing the
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intentions of Anthony Giddens to take seriously the limitations of social enquiry
posited by the delegitimation of Marxism and the assault of postmodernism,
Linklater extracts the core qualities of enlightenment thought and seeks to reapply
them to a post-Westphalian system.43 Whilst strongly supportive of his attempt to
reconstruct both the theory and practice of international relations we have three
concerns. Firstly, our approach is sceptical of a notion of progress in human history
that allows for the evolution of rationality in society through dialectical process.
Secondly, we question the quasi-deterministic interpretation of praxeological develop-
ment employed in Linklater’s work. That humans can reflect on their surroundings
and change them does not infer a capacity to know how to resolve their problems.
And thirdly, we are critical of the employment of Habermasian ‘discourse ethics’ in
Linklater’s recent work. Habermas’s notion of an ‘ideal speech situation’ is neither
realistic nor does it resolve the dilemma that sooner or later a modernist framework
must judge moral problems and risk undermining one or other concern against its
own standard of truth.44 On our reading of Linklater, we see discourse ethics as
concerned with ‘right’ not ‘good’, with procedure not content.
Accepting the constitutive properties of society for the individual, Linklater
posits that social theory must contend with three central questions: the sociological
question of community binaries of inclusion/exclusion, the normative question of
achieving some cosmopolitan ideal of liberty and equality, and the praxeological
question of how humans reflect upon and change their circumstances through time
to achieve such ends.45 Thus Linklater’s method rejects the more commonly under-
stood rendering of the state as the final and ultimate source of ‘actual reason’ and
looks to uncover the process by which reason has actualised itself in the past and
will actualise itself in the future. He goes beyond the justice potentials of non-
intervention and mutual recognition highlighted by the English School and seeks to
illustrate how the development of citizenship rights in states has affected modern
conceptions of justice in international affairs. By focusing on the potential of the
conception of citizenship as a sign of a more inclusionary form of politics, Linklater
asserts that the modern state has set in train a dialectical process that turns against
itself. As he notes:
In modern times, it presses the anti-exclusionary dynamic in the evolution of modern
citizenship further by considering its ramifications for the domain of world politics. The anti-
exclusionary dynamic is a trend of lowering the barriers which prevent excluded groups, such
as subordinate classes, racial and national minorities, and women from enjoying the social
and political rights monopolised by more powerful groups. To press this further is to
recognise that the nation state is one of the few bastions of exclusion which has not had its
rights and claims against the rest of the world seriously questioned.46
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For Linklater, it is this dialectic, between reason already actualised and the ability of
individuals and states to further actualise reason that will provoke the shift towards
a post-Westphalian system. In this way the global polity might realise a greater level
of moral inclusion. On the way, new forms of community that are national,
subnational, regional or transnational will rise and fall with their own sociological
inclusion/exclusion binaries. But, Linklater echoes some common cosmopolitan
arguments by noting two factors in contemporary global politics that will support
progress towards a moral community of humankind.
Firstly, there has been a growth in the scope and recognition of human rights in
international law. The end of the Cold War has witnessed a profusion of both
rhetorical and substantial humanitarian activities by states and non-state actors.
Even if there is broad disagreement as to the shape and content of these rights, in
practice they have served as a useful point of focus for people and groups seeking
emancipation. And secondly, Linklater points to a global recognition of the require-
ment to meet the negative impacts of material inequality, environmental degradation,
and the growing incidence of transnational harm: the evolving ‘communities of fate’
within global politics. He argues that the institutions of global governance, which
monitor such communities, must address the democratic deficit in their operations
via reform and greater engagement with civil society.47 As Molly Cochran surmises,
these trends
. . . are a sign that we are moving beyond the men versus citizens moral dichotomy and that
now our task is to envision new political forms which can further these developments.48
The final part of this transformation in moral and political community is to be
found in Linklater’s call for the development of Habermasian discourse ethics
through a reconstruction of the idea of the state as a bounded moral community. He
favours an open dialogue about the structure of society and politics as a means of
achieving discourse ethics, but contends that this ‘cannot be completed by a number
of separate experiments in democratic participation within independent sovereign
states’, since sovereignty ‘restricts the capacity of outsiders to participate in the
discourse to consider issues which concern them.’49 When combined with questions
of the communities of fate created by various incidents of transnational harm like
global warming, ‘casino’ capitalism, and the exploitation of poor working standards,
this could prove quite a powerful argument for a form of cosmopolitan social
democracy via multi-level governance institutions.
While we find merit in Linklater’s attempt to reconstruct social theory to reclaim
the emancipatory potential of the enlightenment, it seems to overstate the capacity
for political engagement in modern states. It is arguable that the widespread
realisation of citizenship rights in Western countries has to some extent tranquillised
rather than radicalised the forces of popular emancipation within society. More
critically, those politicised activities which cosmopolitans can point to are most
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evident in the rich, northern, white, male, sections of the global polity. This poses a
distinctive question to the content of any radical democracy associated with the
ideal speech situation or discourse ethic: what is the requisite level of critical
reflectivity required for ‘enjoying’ this situation? The principle of opening demo-
cratic conversation does not deal with the question of those people/groups who may
refuse, or are unable, to join the dialogue.
Developing from this point, there is a sense in which discourse ethics might fudge
the issue of political judgement. On one interpretation, it seems to underestimate the
fact that at some point, even within overlapping and diffuse moral political
communities, some form of judgement will have to be made. In Robert Jackson’s
words:
It is not a solution merely to argue for recognition and respect for the ‘other’ and his, her or
their inclusion in the sphere of equality and entitlement. For inclusion only postpones the
unresolved problem of determining which facet of the others’ conduct ought to be recognised
and respected and which not . . . Exclusion and inclusion ultimately is not about class, sex,
race, caste, nationality, and other sociological categories; it is about human conduct.50
It is this human conduct and, more particularly our ability to influence it that is the
central issue in developing any normative agenda for the global polity.
Richard Rorty and an ethic of pragmatic reform?
We have suggested that the foundationalist positions reviewed thus far limit our
capacity to theorise the normative dimension(s) of the global polity to the
philosophical questions of ‘what is?’ – the nature of man, or the global polity – and
then ‘what should be?’ Perhaps a more interesting/practical ethical question, derived
from the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty, might be to ask ‘what could
be?’51 We would argue that the universal individual of the cosmopolitan and the
particular social mores of the communitarian are not sacrosanct truths that can or
should dictate the way we think about ethics under conditions of globalisation. This
is not to deny the importance of ethical or theoretical discourse. Rather it is intended
to humble theory. On this view we could continue to support the aim of political
reconstruction through a post-national public sphere alluded to in Linklater’s work.
But, as the attempt to solve some of the extant social problems we encounter in a
more effective way, rather than as the continuance of some application of timeless
wisdom.
Digging deep into Rorty, we draw out three interrelated facets of this position:
contingency, fallibility and experimentalism, that can be elaborated to both establish
the pragmatic ethic and demonstrate the implicit necessity for those political and
practical aspects of ethical theorising highlighted in this article.
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Contingency
Whereas the contingent nature of knowledge/ethics has created major tensions for
the philosophers considered above, the pragmatic tradition of American philosophy
has had no such insecurities. Rather than becoming transfixed by the nihilistic
implications of cultural relativism, pragmatism seeks to identify and elaborate the
useful aspects of contingent knowledge. As in MacIntyre’s summary of Dewey’s
position:
We only acquired whatever knowledge we have now because we had certain purposes, and the
point of that knowledge is inseparable from our future purposes. All reason is practical
reason . . . [T]o characterise something as good is to say that it will satisfy us in our
purposes.52
Richard Rorty takes up this theme to attack correspondence theories of truth and
seeks to colour as romantic fallacy the very idea that the human mind is a separable
entity that can mirror nature. It is fallacy that simply wastes our intellectual energy.53
The practical worth of philosophy is a recurrent concern of Rortian pragmatism and
his scepticism is closely rivalled by the belief that in dispensing with truth we might
develop a more useful contribution to political life. From this perspective, it can be
argued that both cosmopolitans and communitarians, in their search for an onto-
logical subject, undermine their own position by ignoring the contingency that they
both, in some way, seek to engage. This is more than an abstract philosophical
critique. It holds, we will argue, implications for the mindset we employ to theorise
the normative dimension(s) of the global polity.
By stripping the foundation away from ethical debate, pragmatism tranquillises
the impasse between the universal and the particular. Rorty echoes communitarian
thought in believing that there is no Archimedean frame of reference outside the
community. Practices and knowledge are constructed through interaction within a
situated community. But Rorty does not infer a set of logical propositions based on
the exclusivity of communal value systems. Instead he argues, ‘. . . the main lesson of
both human history and anthropology is our extraordinary malleability.’54 Thus
community values are in a state of constant development and revision. Our ability to
promote a belief is in no way constrained by contingency since all individuals and all
cultures, to some extent at least, seek to universalise their particular view of the
world in exchanges with others and it is through such exchanges that universal
positions become amended.55 For Rorty, linguistic tools have their purposes and so
can be retired when that purpose is done, while other projects and other tools rise to
supersede them. Rorty calls this a ‘change of vocabularies’. In this regard, the
adherence to a particular conceptual approach represents more a set of choices than
a set of discoveries.56
Moreover, by emphasising malleability, pragmatism challenges the communitarian
‘predictive’ qualities emphasised in political realism. If communal value systems are
46 James Brassett and Richard Higgott
52 Cited in Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 207.
53 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
54 Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, p. 169.
55 Thanks to Owen Parker for his advice on this point.
56 For a discussion, see Simon Blackburn, ‘Richard Rorty: A Portrait’, Prospect (April 2003), pp. 56–60.
in a condition of perpetual constitution through interaction then the ‘art of the
possible’ could be regarded as a fairly myopic interpretation of the nature of
contingency. Indeed when combined with themes of reflexive interpenetration and
hybridisation we might argue that pragmatism can bring strength to cosmopolitan
ideals by drawing a global map of moral communities that can be manipulated.
Simply, if we want to universalise an ideal then that will surely involve a process of
ethically ‘lobbying’ different communities to behave in certain ways. There is no
concept of truth here, rather, ethics as an ideology.
Rorty has made some statements about how this kind of ethic could be related to
international affairs. For example, he makes the argument that the theory and
practical development of human rights in the international sphere does not rest
upon the growing realisation of some ahistorical, transcultural truth about what
constitutes human rights and how to implement them. Rather, he highlights the
growth of a ‘human rights culture’ in the post-Holocaust world. Human rights need
only cohere with our beliefs to gain massive support and practical application.
Indeed, its success for Rorty owes ‘nothing to increased moral knowledge, and
everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories.’57
The implications of such a mode of ethical reasoning for developing a normative
agenda for the reform of the global economy are important and as yet barely
articulated within the scholarly cum policy community concerned with such
questions. We only need to look to the sentimental underpinning of concepts such as
social welfare, just distribution, voice, representation, and indeed politicisation of
the economic realm to realise just how much theoretical space could be found in this
brand of pragmatism. Perhaps it is time for the community of scholars working in
these policy areas to engage in Rortian experimentation. To the extent that it is
fallible, this potential is, of course, problematic. We discuss the fallibility before we
discuss the experimentalism.
Fallibility
Accepting the social contingency of knowledge, Rorty (unlike most communi-
tarians) does not extrapolate a set of common principles that can be applied to all
communities. Instead, he emphasises that contingency implies no frame of reference
outside the community. The rhetorical style employed repeatedly uses words like
‘we’, ‘western liberals’, and perhaps most famously Rorty’s quip that he himself is
nothing but a ‘post-modern bourgeois liberal’.58
The ethical dimension of pragmatism is thus heavily imbued with a sense of irony,
or ‘fallibility’. When Rorty celebrates the ‘liberal ironist’ as someone who thinks
‘cruelty is the worst thing we do’, this (wet) optimism is qualified by the fact that
liberal ironists must face ‘. . . up to the contingency of . . . [their] . . . own most
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central beliefs and desires’.59 This is because they believe that the contingency of
knowledge means that there can be nothing but ‘circular’ justifications for political
values. Although they might sympathise with the cosmopolitan urge to realise
human dignity in a moral community of mankind, the liberal ironist cannot ignore
the contingent construction of terms like ‘dignity’ and ‘morality’. In essence, such
words are always the discursive elements of social communication that represent the
‘final vocabulary’ of socially constituted individuals.60 Our final vocabulary might
include words like ‘justice’ ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ or indeed ‘community’ or ‘nation’ but
the meaning which others and ourselves attribute to them is relative. For Rorty, the
self-doubt and circularity of knowledge leads to an ethic of redescription.
Accepting that beliefs are fallible, and any justification of them is in the final
analysis an essentially circular act, pragmatism seeks to redescribe our final vocabu-
laries. In the case of the individual this ethic might lead to attempts to realise
personal freedoms of sexuality or creative interest. In the case of the community
Rorty seeks to extend solidarity by expanding the ‘we’ group within which ethical
deliberation takes place. In this he makes the simple observation that it is much
easier to feel sympathy for people who are in some sense ‘one of us’. Whilst we
might follow Linklater and note an evolving ‘thin community’ of mankind that
recognises collective fate and some form of global identity, it is but one amongst
many instances of ‘we-ness’ along other community lines (race, nation, area, sex,
class, and common history.) Reading back we could attribute to Marxism the
redescription of class as a form of fraternal sympathy. Thus the real strength of
international socialism may have been as a sentimental metaphor about togetherness
in the face of hardship rather than any positivistic law of capital labour relations. As
Rorty surmises, solidarity
. . . is to be achieved not by inquiry, but imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange
people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection, but created. . . . [It] is a
matter of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what
we ourselves are like.61
At root this kind of view is, of course, intensely relativistic and has led to one of the
central criticisms of Rorty: his complacency towards institutions. If there is an
inherent tension in the desire of individuals to redescribe their own vocabularies and
the kind of social vocabularies that bind social collectivities then this form of fallibility
must, in some way, destabilise institutions like the state, the market, education, the
military, and psychological care in the community. This poses a question of central
importance to any attempt to understand the political processes inherent in the search
for a global polity. How does one choose between a radical resistance that ultimately
obliterates institutions of governance and the maintenance and reform of those very
institutions? For Rorty, this is not an irreconcilable problem.
At one level, he argues that institutions are not bound by foundational philosophy
but by the ‘social hope’ that unites community. He cites the decline of religious faith
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in Europe that left modern institutions unaffected, judging that the new secular
vocabularies were able to replace ‘hope of heaven’ with the ‘hope of better social
outcomes’.62 On this view, the Keynesian welfare state may have owed less to any
socioeconomic truth, and more to its ability to bind European communities with
the ‘social hope’ that they could leave behind the collective human suffering of
World War II and fend off the new challenge of communism. At another level,
Rorty concedes that the irony he celebrates could destabilise institutions. He
therefore invokes a public/private split. Whilst the public rhetoric of his liberal
utopia may remain historicist and nominalist – ‘where public doubts are met not by
Socratic requests for definitions and principles, but by Deweyan requests for
concrete alternatives and programmes’ – irony is a quality that he deems to be an
‘inherently private matter’.63 On this view, solidarity must fulfil the (difficult) dual
function of being both a critical, and a stabilising force.64 For example, the liberal
values of individual freedom that catalysed civil rights groups in 1960s America
presented a radical critique of US liberalism which have in turn reinforced
liberalism’s own legitimacy.
But Rorty’s attempt to shore up Western institutions against the possibility of
radical individualism nevertheless exhibits a complacency, or lack of interest not
unfamiliar in most philosophical discourse, to issues of the international or global.
The task for the twentieth century is to ask whether the ethic of redescription can be
extended to the supraterritorial level. For example, on a minor reinterpretation we
might propose that the construction of solidarity amongst communities interacting
within the major international institutions such as the IMF, WBG, WTO, and the
EU, could generate a pragmatic resolve to find more useful ways of talking about
the world. Might not the introduction of Rortian ‘irony’ into the discourse of
technocratic governance at the global level invoke a sense of doubt over the ‘efficacy’
of depoliticised economism of the type exhibited under the umbrella of the
Washington consensus?
At an illustrative level, is it not possible to see the discourse of the post-
Washington Consensus, or what Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik, calls the ‘aug-
mented Washington consensus’ in this light? In more general terms might it not
prompt us to ‘redescribe’ the institutions of the global polity? In times of crisis,
with no obvious way forward other than regime collapse, might the adoption of the
Rortian irony provide mitigation of the bad-tempered discourse between the
globaphiles and globaphobes that is currently polarising and paralysing meaningful
policy change in the global economy? These are important questions for future
research in international relations and the study of the role of the institutions of
governance in the operation of the global political economy in particular.
Experimentalism 
Pragmatism takes the contingency and fallibility of ethics to infer the demise of
grand frameworks like cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. In their stead,
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Rorty advocates the development of moral imagination to redescribe our final
vocabularies. Although intended to restrict pragmatism to reform within liberal
democratic states, we suggest that with a minor reinterpretation, such an ethic could
be productively applied at a number of levels in the global polity. It is through
experimentalism that we feel pragmatism affords its most practical application. After
reviewing Rorty’s critique of Marxism we will set out the parameters for engaging a
pragmatic praxis within the global polity. As Rorty noted in the wake of the fall of
Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe:
I would hope that we have reached a time at which we can finally get rid of the conviction
common to Plato and Marx that there must be large theoretical ways of finding out how to
end injustice, as opposed to small experimental ways.65
He exhorts us to dispense with grand theoretical terms like ‘anti-capitalist struggle’
and instead substitute something banal and un-theoretical like ‘the struggle against
avoidable human misery’.66 Critical politics could be supplemented by an ethical
concern for notions like ‘sympathy for human lives’ and an agenda to create ‘social
hope’ through the construction of solidarity, or we-ness, on issues relating to poverty,
disease, famine, lack of representation, social alienation, or sociopolitical instability
as a result of an utterly rigid financial architecture? In short, reformist or trans-
formational politics could better concern itself with a sympathetic repetition of the
words we can in the face of human suffering.
The experimentalism of this approach is twofold. Firstly, due to the contingency
and fallibility of knowledge, a capacity to regard our agendas as potentially flawed
in both motivation and outcome is vital. The experience of Communism in the
USSR would illustrate the drawback of denying the possibility of failure. Secondly,
perhaps more powerfully, the ability to regard such contingent social constructions
as sympathy and solidarity as the bedrock of pragmatism brings a perpetual quality
to reformism. It is a quality that is notably lacking on the agenda of international
relations, of both the scholar and practitioner alike. Simply, the contingency of
reform requires an ability to continually experiment with ways of understanding and
creating sympathy and solidarity. The experimentalism of the pragmatic ethic means
that human suffering is an ever-changing facet of reality, which requires innovative
agendas for articulating and effecting responses. It is a perpetual reflex that requires
greater elaboration in the global polity.
Thus we have in pragmatism an ethical agenda which points to many avenues.
Accepting contingency, we might reinvigorate our belief in universalising a particular
viewpoint on the basis that it might solve some of ‘our’ problems in a more
effective way. The questions of who is ‘we’ and what is ‘effective’ are deemed as
matters for ironic redescription. Thus at a certain point ‘we’ in Britain might
convince ourselves of the ‘effectiveness’ of European level financial coordination
via membership of the Euro and thus create a new ‘we’ for ethical deliberation. In
doing so we will open both our institutions and understandings of solidarity to
change through redescription.
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Reading global politics in this way, a pragmatic ethic opens itself to more institu-
tional questions than even Rorty envisages. This is no major challenge to prag-
matism. Rorty, an American bourgeois liberal, is used to the effectiveness and
exclusivity of US political structures. (Although he would probably not have expected
the degree of exclusivity and imperialness of the American structures in the early
years of the twenty-first century). For European social democrats, concerned with
the possibilities of reconstructing welfare systems through European and global
institutions for example, the pragmatic ethic can be adapted. Accepting the
experimentalism of pragmatism, reformist politics are exhorted to have sympathy for
human lives and find innovative agendas for both describing and rescribing those
lives.
Pragmatic redescription in the global polity: some early thoughts
Can pragmatic redescription provide something more than just a principled wish
list? At the very least it is a question worth further investigation. Here we can do no
more than suggest alternative ways of thinking and acting. We start by noting that
the development of a contingent fallible ethic of redescription should be a project
for both scholars and practitioners alike. The scholarly study of globalisation and an
emerging global polity must develop a critical problem-solving purpose that takes us
beyond Robert Cox’s once useful, but now inhibiting, distinction between inter-
national relations scholarship as either critical theory or problem-solving.67 By
interpreting and redescribing discursive practices employed within the global polity
(to date mostly the work of economists), philosophers and theorists of international
relations should play a greater role in the development of the knowledge and power
structures they contingently observe but have of late done little to affect.68 Through-
out the twentieth century, political philosophers and international relations scholars
ceded the policy ground to the economists in the domains of global economic
governance. In the twenty-first century they must battle the economists for the role
of pragmatic redescribers. Let us remember Keynes’ famous quote about the power
of ideas in full:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by
little else.69 (Emphasis added).
A pragmatic political praxis could be developed through ‘acts of redescription’ in
the global polity. But it is not enough to endlessly theorise what the global polity is,
we should also ask what could it be?70 Is there, within the global polity, space for
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developing new understandings of ‘we-ness’? We would not, of course, wish to over-
state this idea. We are a long way from the kind of bottom-up dialogic potentials
that Habermas and Linklater advance. Instead the pragmatic ethic of contingent
fallible reform must be focused upon achieving what can be achieved. In the context
of the global polity, for example, the issue is to what extent the real potential of the
international institutions for promoting global welfare can be achieved by acts of
pragmatic redescription supporting incremental change in rhetorical agendas.
Emphasis on the human dimension of markets (as social constructs) that has crept
into recent policy initiatives associated with the post-Washington and augmented
Washington consensus and debates over the delivery of global public goods, could be
elaborated and reinforced by scholarly deliberation on their content and meaning.71
At another level, those academics that have ‘discovered’ the vanguard potential in
global civil society for reconstructing democratic activity and elaborating social
concerns should check the fallibility of their interest.72 Although civil society
activists have undoubtedly made progress towards opening up a space in which to be
heard within the recent discussion on globalisation, the content and democratic
credentials of that voice are not viewed as unambiguously acceptable or beneficial in
all quarters. ‘Uncivil’ society also abounds and some elements of the media are
hostile on all occasions. Within the institutions of global economic governance, the
relationship with civil society is clearly developing,73 but it is a process of experi-
mentation in which uncertainty is a characteristic of, and for, both parties. The
reformist potential of civil society is contingent, fallible, and experimental. If an
agenda of reglobalisation, according to principles of social welfare, is to supplant
the current agenda of anti-globalisation protest a discourse of pragmatism must
gain ground. Support for pragmatic reformism can be found in strange quarters. See
for example, the calls by George Soros for a new fund at the IMF for Special
Drawing Rights for developing countries.74
‘Feasible globalisations’, not utopian alternatives, are required. Dani Rodrik, in
one very interesting exercise in Rortian pragmatic redescription (although Rodrik, as
an impeccably trained economist, would probably not recognise it as such) argues
for a reform of the global market-governance nexus. The political trilemma of the
global economy, he says, is the incompatibility of the continued existence of the
nation state (to ensure self-determination), the development of democratic politics
beyond the state (to ensure that public policy is accountable) and the continuing
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economic integration of the global economy to enhance living standards.75 At best
we can secure two of these three goals, never all of them, and global markets
(economic integration) without global governance are unsustainable.
The current neoliberal agenda (as reflected, for example, in US strategy in the
Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations with its emphasis on the continuing
elimination of barriers to trade and capital movements) reflects an aggressive drive
for enhanced (deep) global economic integration. But such integration sits at odds
with the residual strength of nation states and the clamour for democratic politics. It
thus remains neither feasible nor desirable, says Rodrik, to continue towards global
economic integration greater than is compatible with the desires of nation states and
the expansion of democratic accountability. Thus we need to think, more prag-
matically, of what can be achieved. For Rodrik, the alternative is:
. . . a renewed Bretton Woods Compromise: preserving some limits on integration, as built
into original Bretton Woods arrangements, along with some more global rules to handle the
integration that can be achieved. Those who would make different choices – towards tighter
economic integration – must face up to the corollary: either tighter world government or less
democracy.76
In an era when who wins and who loses are becoming increasingly important
yardsticks for judging the fairness of competing models of economic organisation
we might need to ‘… scale down our ambitions with respect to global economic
integration … [and] … do a better job of writing the rules for a thinner version of
globalization’.77 Why is Rodrik’s argument an important exercise in Rortian
redescription? Four reasons:
1. The argument is not self-evident within the community of neoclassical econo-
mists from which Rodrik emanates. Rather, he assumes that markets are
embedded in a non-market social institutional context. To readers of literature
influenced by Karl Polanyi or John Ruggie over the last twenty years this may
not seem particularly dramatic. In the context of the post-1990s neoliberal
economic orthodoxy, it is transformative.
2. Rodrik accepts the reality of a wide divergence of both functions and form in
the nature of capitalist institutional economic organisation. Again, there is a
large body of continental European (social-democratic) and Asian
(developmental statist) literature on the institutional arrangements of capitalist
economic organisation. It is the extent to which Rodrik’s position runs counter
to much Anglo-American economic orthodoxy on the legitimacy of alternative
forms of institutional economic organisation that makes for an important
redescription.
3. His argument eschews the essentialist teleological logic of the neoliberal view of
globalisation, one in which full global economic integration is the ultimate goal.
4. In an era when traditional restrictions on trade and investment (such as tariffs)
are much less salient than in the second half of the twentieth century, juris-
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dictional and regulatory instruments emanating from state actors are the major
constraints on deep integration. Attempts to remove these inhibitors (part of the
WTO agenda) can only be justifiable, argues Rodrik, if one ignores the import-
ant sociopolitical and cultural functions that such institutions perform. The
dismissal of the importance of these functions has been central to neoliberal
economic thinking in the heyday of globalisation that dominated the closing
quarter of the twentieth century. Hence Rodrik’s assertion of their virtue, and
the need to tread carefully in their dismantling, represents a departure from
orthodox thinking about the management of globalisation.
In turning away from these key elements of neoliberal economic orthodoxy, yet
without resisting the essential importance of market activity and structures, Rodrik
is engaged in a major exercise in what we have chosen to call Rortian pragmatic
redescription. Such an approach to trying to develop an ethic of globalisation is not
found amongst either the globalisation boosters or much of the anti-globalisation
movement that generate more heat than light in current discussions about how we
might either manage or change the contemporary global economic order.
Finally, an ethical agenda must provide social hope. The construction of ‘we-ness’
cannot look backwards and find some transhistorical, transcultural ‘proof’ of
human community or equality. Instead a pragmatic ethic must look forward to
finding a ‘we’ that can talk more usefully about issues of transnational inter-
dependence. If, for example, we are to universalise a belief in a reconstruction of
systems of welfare that are analogous to an earlier Keynesian ethic, then an
innovative redescription of the global polity – as a collection of human beings that
share a capacity to suffer and an ability to mitigate that suffering – is required.
Conclusion
In this article we have offered but one way of trying to carve out some space for
ethical thinking beyond the borders of the modern state in an era of globalisation.
Like Rorty, who we think does himself a disservice in his self-description as a ‘post-
modern bourgeois liberal’ our views are very much reformist. Two quotes, extracted
from Chris Brown’s delightfully cheeky last chapter to his Sovereignty, Rights and
Justice volume, capture a key essence of this article. Citing the banner at the London
2001 May Day Rally – ‘Replace capitalism with something nicer’ – Brown hopes it is
meant to be humorous. 78 So do we. It reflects the total lack of a positive agenda for
change, rather than a negative agenda of mere resistance, that infuses much of the
anti-globalisation movement. Again citing Rorty, ‘. . . [if] you still long for total
revolution, for the Radical Other on a world historical scale, the events of 1989 show
that you are out of luck’.79
A strategy of redescription, as part of a reformist strategy, assumes that the
reform of capitalism has to be possible. We suspect it will not please observers on
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either end of the globalisation–anti-globalisation continuum. But, we would argue –
current problems in the global economy (indeed the global order in general)
notwithstanding – that there is nothing to suggest that the market economy is likely
to disappear in a hurry. Other world ideologies are not lining up to replace it.
Reform has to be the order of the day. The ethical redescription of globalisation
needs to be a starting point for that process. Philosophers, theorists and practi-
tioners of IR must join economists as key players in this process in the first decade
of the twenty-first century in a way that they were not in the closing decade of the
twentieth.
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